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This paper studies the optimal monetary policy response to persistent changes in the growth
rate of productivity. To this end, we formulate a sticky price model in which agents are uncertain
about the persistence of observed productivity shocks. In this environment, trend shocks are
initially perceived as transitory, causing wage demands to lag behind realized productivity. As
a result, marginal costs and inﬂation fall after a positive shock, consistent with the data–and
with conventional wisdom. From a positive standpoint, the model’s dynamics in response to
a productivity shock are in line with the main features of available VAR estimates. They also
provide a remarkably accurate account of the observed evolution of output and inﬂation in
the wake of the recent productivity pickup. From a normative perspective, we ﬁnd that the
adjustment in the real wage required by a positive productivity shock should be shared between
an increase in the nominal wage and a reduction in the price level, in proportions that depend on
the relative stickiness of the two prices. Finally, the model lends formal support to the popular
idea that the Federal Reserve reacted appropriately to the productivity resurgence of the late
1990s.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E31, E52, E58
Keywords: Growth rate shocks, sticky prices, partial information, stagﬂation, New Economy.
∗I wish to thank the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for its hospitality, Ben Bernanke, Alan
Blinder, Gauti Eggertsson, Giovanni Favara, Mark French, Dale Henderson, Thomas Laubach, Guido Lorenzoni,
Ann Morning, Fabrizio Perri, Bruce Preston, Giorgio Primiceri, John Roberts, Ernst Schaumburg, Chris Sims, Lars
Svensson, Lawrence Uren, Mark Watson, seminar participants at Princeton University, the Federal Reserve Board,
the Inter-University Student Conference at the University of Pennsylvania and the Society for Economic Dynamics
2002 Meetings for comments and suggestions, Marty Eichenbaum for providing the ﬁgure of the estimated impulse
responses and especially Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Mike Woodford for numerous discussions and precious advice.
This paper represents the views of the author and should not be interpreted as reﬂecting the views of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System or other members of its staﬀ.
†Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544. Email: tamba@princeton.edu.R e v i s i o n s
available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~tamba.“By now, the story of the boom in information technology is well known, and nearly
everyone perceives that the resulting more rapid growth of labor productivity is at least
partly enduring. (...) With output per hour having accelerated, cost pressures have
been patently contained. For the most part, the Federal Reserve generally recognized
these changing fundamentals and calibrated American monetary policy accordingly.
(Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, Challenges for Monetary Policymakers, at
the 18th Annual Monetary Conference: Monetary Policy in the New Economy,C a t o
Institute, Washington, D.C. October 19, 2000).
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The investigation of the role of technology and monetary policy shocks in economic ﬂuctuations
has been at the center of macroeconomic research for the last two decades, starting from the
prototypical real business cycle models of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser
(1983) and arriving at the latest estimated structural models with nominal rigidities of Altig,
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2002), with the monetary
vector autoregression literature and the New Neoclassical/Keynesian Synthesis to represent the
key empirical and theoretical stepping-stones along the way.1 Remarkably, given the historical
evolution of this broad research agenda, the question of the interaction between monetary policy and
technological progress, and in particular of the role that monetary policy might play in dampening
economic ﬂuctuations originating from productivity shocks, has received far less attention.2 This
is all the more surprising if we recall that the ﬁrst attempts at introducing money and prices in a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model were conducted within an otherwise standard RBC
model, with ﬂuctuations driven exclusively by technology shocks.3
This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap on three complementary levels. First, at the positive level,
it proposes a sticky price model of the transmission of productivity shocks, whose speciﬁcation is
guided by the observed dynamic behavior of real and nominal variables in response to an identiﬁed
technology shock. Besides reproducing the main features of the response of the U.S. economy to
an “average” shock to productivity growth, the model provides a surprisingly accurate account of
the puzzling evolution of inﬂation and real activity that accompanied the productivity revival of
the second half of the 1990s (Ball and Moﬃtt, 2001; Staiger, Stock and Watson, 2001). It also
provides some clues on the possible causes of the “great stagﬂation” of the 1970s.4 Second, shifting
1 See also Prescott (1986), Plosser (1989) and King and Rebelo (1999); Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999),
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001), Boivin and Giannoni (2001) and Amato and Laubach (2002); Bernanke
and Blinder (1992), Leeper, Sims and Zha (1997), Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1999); King and Wolman (1996), Woodford (1996), Yun (1996), Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida, Galí
and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2002).
2 Ireland (1996), Galí (2001) and Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2002) are among the most signiﬁcant exceptions.
3 Among the early contributions were King and Plosser (1984) and Cooley and Hansen (1989). See also Cooley
and Hansen (1995).
4 Blinder (1979) is a classic reference on the subject. De Long (1997) and Sargent (1999) are two modern and
1onto normative grounds, we formulate a policy problem that is approximately equivalent to that of
maximizing the utility of the representative agent in the model. By solving this problem, we are able
to characterize the optimal path of the policy instrument following a growth rate shock, together
with the associated equilibrium ﬂuctuations of the endogenous variables. These ﬂuctuations are
then compared to those that would emerge from some simple policy prescriptions, like strict inﬂation
targeting, as well as to those that were observed after the major productivity shocks of the early
seventies and mid-nineties. Finally, from a methodological perspective, the paper introduces a
variant of the imperfect information story of Lucas (1972, 1975) into a New Keynesian model with
nominal rigidities, thus mixing important aspects of the two predominant modern theories about
the importance of money for business cycle ﬂuctuations (Cooley and Hansen, 1995).
The ﬁrst step in our analysis is to ask whether the dynamics triggered by a shock to the growth
rate of productivity in a “standard” sticky price model match, at least qualitatively, what is observed
in the data. In conducting this comparison, we mainly rely on the VAR evidence presented by Altig
et al. (2002) (henceforth ACEL), whose estimated impulse responses to a permanent technology
shock are reported in ﬁgure 1.5 One of the most signiﬁcant features of these impulse responses
is the negative conditional correlation between output and inﬂation, which is in contrast with the
more familiar positive relation associated with movements along the Phillips curve. In particular,
after a positive shock to the growth rate of productivity, inﬂation declines signiﬁcantly for at least
two quarters, and possibly for as much as three years. In a standard sticky price model on the
contrary, a surge in productivity reduces unit labor costs, but with perfectly competitive labor
markets, the ensuing increase in real wages exactly oﬀsets the initial impact of the shock. This
general equilibrium eﬀect then, by severing the link between real marginal costs and productivity,
i n s u l a t e sp r i c e sa n di n ﬂation from technology shocks.6 The counterfactual behavior of the model
along this particular dimension is especially troublesome for our analysis, since one of its main
objectives is to derive a set of constraints for the optimal policy problem that reﬂect the nature
of the trade-oﬀs actually faced by central banks as they strive to insulate the economy from the
eﬀects of productivity shocks.
Among the maintained assumptions of the standard model, one in particular results both in-
strumental to the counterfactual behavior just described, and especially irrealistic in the context
of our study. This is the assumption of perfect information on the distribution of shocks, which
implies that all agents in the economy can precisely forecast the entire future evolution of observed
shocks. In reality, one of the consistent historical features of the public’s and policy makers’ re-
sponse to persistent growth rate shocks has been an extremely gradual updating of their expected
long run eﬀect.7 Following this lead, we then formulate a model in which the response of wages
inﬂuential reconstructions of those same events.
5 ACEL identify this shock as the only source of the unit root in average labor productivity, as in Galí (1999).
A c c o r d i n gt ot h e i re s t i m a t e s ,t h egrowth rate of the shock is distributed as an AR(1) process with an autoregressive
coeﬃcient of 0.8.
6 Section 1.1 illustrates this point more formally.
7 This is witnessed for example by the extreme caution with which the media routinely receive new evidence on
2to a productivity disturbance is delayed by a particular form of imperfect information, whereby
agents, upon observation of a shock, cannot conclusively infer its degree of persistence. As a result,
whenever the shock is in fact persistent, workers come to this realization only gradually, causing
wage demands to lag behind realized productivity. Decoupling the movements of real wages and
productivity in the short run, this mechanism contributes to a temporary fall in marginal costs and
inﬂation following a positive productivity shock. The extent to which this transmission channel
can quantitatively reconcile the model’s predictions with the data is at the center of our positive
investigation.
The idea that wage contracts might incorporate adjustments to slowly evolving wage aspirations,
or to ﬁltered estimates of the growth rate of productivity, and that the resulting inertia might drive
a wedge between wages and productivity following signiﬁcant changes in its rate of growth dates
back at least to Jackman et al. (1982) and Braun (1984), and has witnessed a recent revival as a
possible explanation of the unusual joint behavior of inﬂation and real activity in the second half
of the nineties (Blinder, 2000; De Long, 2000; Ball and Moﬃtt, 2001). Our contribution in this
respect is to take this idea from the realm of simple hypothesis, or of loosely speciﬁed regression
models, and to incorporate it into a fully speciﬁed model of price and wage setting. We do this
by relying on the version of the story based on the slow adjustment of growth estimates (Blinder,
2000), ﬁrst, because it does not require any departure from standard rational accounts of agents’
behavior and, second, because uncertainty on the persistence of the recent productivity pickup has
been one of the dominant notes in the debate spurred by this important event.8
As a possible alternative to the research strategy pursued in this paper, we could have indeed
directly adopted the theoretical model proposedi nA C E L ,a n ds h o w nt h e r et op r o v i d eag o o dm a t c h
to the empirical impulse responses that we are also trying to replicate. Two main considerations
kept us from following this approach. First, we wanted to limit the complexity of our model to
concentrate on the transmission channels of productivity shocks that are likely to be more relevant
for short term policy considerations. This meant in particular abstracting from capital accumulation
and all the related real frictions. As an important by-product of this simpliﬁcation, it is possible to
derive a second order approximation to the utility function of the representative agent as a model-
consistent welfare criterion. Second, even with its wide array of real frictions, ACEL’s model is
not particularly successful at replicating the negative conditional correlation between inﬂation and
real activity, which we consider a fundamental stylized fact of the transmission of productivity
shocks. In this respect, imperfect information can be thought of as a complementary mechanism
the productivity acceleration that has aﬀected the U.S. economy since the mid-nineties. On November 8th 2002 for
example, after the realease of strong third quarter productivity data, the New York Times reported that “a signiﬁcant
share of the step-up in economic eﬃciency achieved during the boom of the late 1990’s could continue over the long
run” (emphasis added). See also the Economics focus in The Economist of November 2nd 2002 (“Productivity
promises: How much of America’s surge in productivity growth can be sustained?”) and the evolution of the Federal
Reserve’s views on productivity in the period 1997-1999 as reconstructed in section 4.
8 Jorgenson (2001) and Gordon (2002) are two prominent academic contributions to this debate; Greenspan (2000)
provides the perspective of an important policymaker, while Woodward (2000) contains a journalistic account and a
popular interpretation of the events.
3to the ones identiﬁed in ACEL to explain the observed behavior of aggregate variables in response
to technology shocks.
The paper’s main results can be summarized as follows. First, following a persistent shock
to the growth rate of productivity, our model can generate reductions in costs and inﬂation that
are close to those observed in the data. However, other informational frictions besides partial
information are quantitatively at least as important for this result as the latter. Second, monetary
policy should maintain a procyclical stance in reaction to technology disturbances, decreasing the
nominal interest rate below its ﬂexible price counterpart following a positive growth rate shock.
Such policy has the eﬀect of inducing the desired long run adjustment of the real wage through
increases in the nominal wage rate and reductions in the price level, in proportions that depend on
the relative ﬂexibility of the two prices. As a consequence, policies that strictly target the price
or wage inﬂation rate are clearly undesirable. On the other hand, a policy that tries to stabilize
the central bank’s forecast of the model consistent output gap is close to optimal. Finally, when
perturbed by an appropriately scaled shock, the model’s optimal equilibrium displays a path of
average productivity, interest rates, inﬂation and output growth, which is remarkably close to that
observed in the second half of the 1990s. Hence the conclusion that in that period the Federal
Reserve calibrated American monetary policy according to the model...
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 oﬀers some more detail on the
“standard” sticky price model and on its behavior following a productivity shock. Section 2 presents
the model economy, starting with assumptions on tastes, technology and information. In particular,
section 2.6 reviews the main steps in the derivation of the welfare criterion, whose details are
relegated to appendix A. Section 3 describes the dynamics of the model following a productivity
shock for a given policy rule, while section 5 discusses the properties of the optimal equilibrium.
Sections 4 and 6 compare the macroeconomic developments that accompanied the two major post-
war productivity shocks with simulations from the model, from both a positive and a normative
perspective. Section 7 concludes. Finally, appendices B and C contain some details on the solution
and ﬁltering of the system of linearized ﬁrst order conditions and on the computation of the optimal
equilibrium.
1.1 The Neutrality of Productivity Shocks in a Standard Model
This section provides a complete description of what we referred to above as the “standard” sticky
price model. There is certainly a signiﬁcant degree of arbitrariness in deﬁning a “standard” model
in the context of any ﬁeld. Nevertheless, we found it useful to crystallize the existing literature
in a paradigmatic model, not with the intent of denouncing its assumptions as ﬂawed, but rather
as a way of organizing our thoughts around a familiar and largely diﬀused benchmark. Three
fundamental assumptions characterize in our judgment this prototypical model. First, output is
produced with labor as the only input. Second, goods’ prices are sticky, and set in staggered
fashion. Third, labor markets are perfectly competitive. For instance, these are the assumptions
4that underlie several contributions in the inﬂuential Taylor (1999) volume, as well as the models in
Woodford (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), just to
name a few prominent examples.
A simple but fairly representative rendition of this model is that in Galí (2001), which we
summarize here for expositional convenience.9 The representative household’s utility is separable















and a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed by z produces diﬀerentiated goods
according to the log-linear production function
yt (z)=at + ht (z)
where at denotes the logarithm of productivity and Ht ≡
R 1
0 exp[ht (z)]dz. Given an economy-wide
competitive labor market, ﬁrms face a common real marginal cost
st = wt − pt − at
while workers’ optimization on the consumption-leisure margin implies
wt − pt = σyt + ϕht
where wt−pt is the logarithm of the real wage and lower case letters denote the logarithms of their
upper case counterparts. Making use of the approximation yt = at+ht, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium
st =( σ − 1)at +( σ + ϕ)ht
The reason for focusing on this cost measure is that in this class of models real marginal costs are
the only determinants of ﬁrms’ optimal pricing behavior. In the presence of price setting frictions
àl aCalvo (1983) for example, this results in a Phillips curve of the form
πt = βEtπt+1 + κˆ st
where πt is inﬂation, ˆ st denotes the deviation of st from its steady state level and κ is a positive
coeﬃcient that depends on the frequency of price adjustment.
Two important considerations follow from this derivation. First, with the restriction σ =1
required for the existence of a balanced growth path, positive productivity shocks are reﬂected
one to one in the equilibrium real wage, oﬀsetting entirely the partial equilibrium cost reduction
normally associated with productivity improvements. Evidently, under these conditions technology
shocks cannot have any direct impact on prices and inﬂation. Intuitively, the assumption of perfectly
9 We refer the reader to Galí (2001) for further details on the model and the derivation of its equilibrium.
5competitive labor markets imposes the desired cointegration between income and real wages by
locking them together in the short run. Introducing a temporary wedge between the comovements
of these two variables, imperfect information contributes to generate an environment in which
increases in output per hour help to contain cost pressures, as observed by Chairman Greenspan in
our opening quote. Note also that wage stickiness alone would not necessarily produce the desired
result. This is because in a forward looking model, wage inﬂation would in fact overshoot the
currently observed surge in productivity if agents anticipated further productivity increases in the
future, as would be the case for the kind of persistent growth rate shocks considered here.10
A second important point is that, even in the case σ 6=1 , a monetary policy that stabilized the
real marginal cost around its steady state level, or equivalently the level of output around its ﬂexible
price equilibrium, would also result in zero inﬂation, again severing the link between productivity
and prices. This is precisely the case emphasized by Galí (2001), one in which productivity shocks
do not pose any stabilization trade-oﬀ to the monetary authority. Interestingly, Galí et al. (2002)
present some VAR evidence that, during the Volcker-Greenspan era, inﬂation did not signiﬁcantly
respond to identiﬁed productivity shocks, while this response was negative and signiﬁcant in the
pre-Volker period. This evidence would then seem to suggest that the normative question posed
in this study has a very simple answer: stabilize the output gap, and that this is exactly what
the Federal Reserve has been doing for at least twenty years. Several considerations make us
doubt this conclusion. First, according to most accounts, the Federal Reserve spent a considerable
amount of eﬀort to “calibrate” its monetary policy in response to the productivity acceleration of
the mid-nineties.11 Second, Galí et al. (2002) do not present any explicit empirical evidence on the
statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence in the behavior of inﬂation across the two sub-periods in
their analysis.12 Third, as we will see in section 5, although in our model output gap stabilization
closely approximates the optimal policy, it does not imply a stable inﬂation rate. Quite to the
contrary, a policy that did stabilize inﬂation would result in very undesirable welfare consequences.
We ﬁnd that these exceptions provide enough ground to proceed with our analysis, which begins
in the next section with the description of our structural model.
2 The Model
This section presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the monetary transmission
mechanism, whose microeconomic foundations derive from the work of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) and Amato and Laubach (2002). As in Amato and Laubach (2002) and Erceg, Henderson and
Levin (2000), we introduce wage setting frictions in the labor market, along with price stickiness in
the market for consumption goods. As argued in the previous section, abandoning the assumption
10 This is a consequence of the well-known front loading eﬀect described by Christiano et al. (2001). Mankiw and
Reis (2002) present a “sticky information” model in which this eﬀect is absent and that is very similar in spirit to
the model developed here.
11See for example Woodward (2000).
12 In fact, according to preliminary results in ACEL, the evidence of subsample instability is at best marginal.
6of perfect competition in the labor market is a necessary condition for productivity shocks to play
any role in this class of models. Assuming that labor and goods markets share the same kind of
price frictions is a particularly convenient way of fulﬁlling this condition.
The section’s main contribution is twofold. First, it considers explicitly the possibility of secular
growth. This requires to impose some restrictions on utility and production functions, of the
kind that King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988, 2002) showed to be necessary to produce long run
implications of a model economy in accordance with the basic growth facts. It also illustrates
how these restrictions, together with a fairly natural assumption on wage indexation, are suﬃcient
to maintain almost intact the basic structure of the standard models of pricing based on Calvo
(1983). Second, it presents an environment in which productivity is the sum of two stochastic
components with diﬀering degrees of persistence, but only its overall level is observable. As a
consequence, agents forecast its future evolution through a Kalman ﬁlter, which imparts signiﬁcant
inertia to their reaction to shocks, contributing to generate the negative conditional correlation
between inﬂation and real activity that is the distinctive feature of the model.
The structural representation of the economy is completed with the derivation of a welfare
criterion for policy evaluation, which is based on a second order expansion to the utility of the
representative agent. Given appropriate assumptions on the magnitude of the distortions in the
economy, this expansion, evaluated through a linear approximation to the structural equilibrium
relations, provides an accurate gauge of the eﬀect of alternative policies on the welfare of the
representative agent, up to a residual that is of third order in the amplitude of the shocks.
2.1 Tastes, Technology and Information
We consider an economy populated by three classes of agents: a government, a continuum of
households indexed by j ∈ [0,1] and a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by z ∈ [0,1], whose ownership
is equally shared among the households.
Government The government is composed of two branches, a ﬁscal and a monetary authority.
The ﬁscal authority levies a proportional tax τ on the sales of consumption goods and rebates the
proceeds to the households through a lump-sum transfer. The monetary authority sets the level of
the short term nominal interest rate, as further detailed in section 2.7 below.
Firms Firm z is a monopolist on the market for its output, that is produced using the com-
posite labor input ht(z). As in Erceg et al. (2000), this is a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregate of a









7Each of these specialized “skills” trades at a wage wt(j) on an economy-wide market, from which














is the wage index associated with the minimum expenditure purchase of one unit of Ht.
Output yt(z) is produced according to the production function
yt(z)=Atf (ht(z))
where f is increasing and concave, and At represents a technology factor.13 Following a long-
standing tradition in the New Keynesian analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism, we
abstract from capital accumulation.
Our main point of departure from this literature is instead in the distributional assumptions on
At. In particular, we assume that the growth rate of productivity, γa
t ≡ lnAt − lnAt−1, follows a
stationary process, which is the sum of a persistent (“trend”) and an i.i.d. component, as in
γa
t = γt + εa
t (2a)






t are orthogonal i.i.d. shocks with mean zero and variances σ2
a and σ2
γ respectively,
0 <ρ<1 and γ is the average growth rate.14 We furthermore assume that all agents in the
economy, including the monetary authority, can observe the level of productivity At, along with
the vector of endogenous variables Xt, but not the shocks ε
γ
t and εa
t separately. More formally, we





τ;Xτ}τ≤t , where I
f
t represents
full information. Note that this form of limited information is not necessarily a “binding” constraint
on agents’ decision making, at least as long as their actions do not require them to forecast future
economic conditions. This would for instance be the case for a ﬁrm that can reoptimize its price
every period. It is only when decision making involves expectations about the future evolution of
productivity, as for a ﬁrm that is allowed to reset its price only at certain intervals, that partial
information becomes relevant. In this case, we assume that agents would make the best possible
use of all the available information and use a Kalman ﬁlter to forecast the future evolution of
productivity, as detailed in appendix B.
13 In what follows we refer to At indiﬀerently as technology or (total factor) productivity. When the distinction is
relevant, we will refer explicitly to (average) labor productivity.
14 The model can easily accomodate a much richer speciﬁcation of the productivity process. See appendix B for
more details.
8Households Household j is endowed with one unit per period of the specialized labor ht (j),
on whose market it is a monopolist. The household sets the wage rate wt(j) for period t and
supplies the amount of hours demanded by ﬁrms at the posted price, as further discussed in section







to maximize a time




βs−t [u(Cs(j)) − v(hs(j))] (3)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor and Ct(j) is an aggregator of the levels of con-











The expectation in equation (3) is based on the information publicly available as of time t−1,I t−1.
This captures an information processing (or implementation) delay, as for example in Christiano
et al. (2001). In this context, besides preventing demand from jumping immediately in response
to shocks, this assumption has the realistic feature of making the output gap unobservable, in a
s e n s et h a tw i l lb em a d em o r ep r e c i s ei ns e c t i o n2.3. Note also that money does not enter the
utility function, and in fact does not play any explicit role in our model. We are in other words
assuming to be in a “cashless limiting economy”, in which the role of money balances in facilitating
transactions is negligible (Woodford, 2002).
If we assume the existence of complete ﬁnancial markets, and therefore of a unique kernel
Qt,s for the pricing of stochastic ﬂows of nominal income, given a sequence of goods’ prices
{ps(z),z∈ [0,1]}
∞
s=t , we can write the household’s intertemporal budget constraint looking for-














Et−1Qt−1,s [ws (j)hs(j)+Πs (j)]
(4)
where Bt(j) is initial wealth and Πt(j) are the proﬁts accruing to the household, net of any lump
sum taxes.15 In general, depending on the realized frequency with which they are oﬀered the chance
to reset their wage, diﬀerent agents will experience very diﬀerent employment histories, and thus
very diﬀerent levels of human wealth. Nevertheless, if at any point in time τ<tthe distribution
of wealth {Bτ(j)}j is such that the right hand side of (4) is the same for all j, then, from then
on, the optimal consumption proﬁle will be identical for all households. In what follows we will
assume that this is indeed the case, and consequently drop the j index that distinguishes individual
consumption choices.
15 We refer the reader to Woodford (2002) for a detailed derivation of the intertemporal budget constraint in a
closely related model and for a general discussion of models in which current consumption decisions are based on
lagged information.
9The solution to the household’s consumption problem yields the following optimality conditions.








where ct(z) is total demand for good z, Ct is the index of aggregate consumption and Pt is deﬁned
analogously to (1). Second, the optimal choice of aggregate consumption satisﬁes
Et−1 [uC (Ct)] = Λt−1Et−1 [Qt−1,tPt] (6)
where Λt−1, the multiplier on the intertemporal budget constraint (4), measures the marginal utility
of nominal income. Finally, the optimal allocation of resources across time and states achieved
through complete ﬁnancial markets implies
ΛtQt,s = βs−tΛs (7)
and therefore
Λt = βEt [RtΛt+1] (8)
where R−1
t ≡ Et [Qt,t+1] is the price of a riskless bond held between t and t +1 , so that Rt is the
gross short term nominal interest rate.
2.2 Flexible Price Equilibrium and the Balanced Growth Path
Having introduced the basic building blocks of the model, and before proceeding to the description of
the price frictions that constitute the necessary premise to a well deﬁn e dp o l i c yp r o b l e m ,i ti su s e f u l
to consider the model’s behavior with ﬂexible prices. This exercise becomes even more crucial in
the context of our non-stationary economy, since it will help us to characterize the balanced growth
path that the economy would follow in the absence of shocks. It will then be around this path
that we approximate the model’s ﬁrst order conditions to provide a dynamic characterization of
the equilibrium responses to shocks.
When prices are ﬂexible, ﬁrms reset their price every period to maximize their instantaneous
proﬁts, taking as given the demand function for their output. From (5) and the fact that private







T h er e s u l to fp r o ﬁt maximization is an optimal price (net of the sales tax) that is set as a ﬁxed
markup over marginal cost. In real terms
pt(z)
Pt (1 − τ)=µpst(z)
10where µp ≡
θp
θp−1 > 1 is the optimal (gross) markup for a monopolist facing a demand curve with

















where µw ≡ θw
θw−1 > 1.
As a result, in a symmetric equilibrium with identical prices and wages across ﬁrms and house-








where YAt ≡ Yt/At = f (Ht) is the eﬀective level of output. Note that, without some restrictions on
the utility function u, we cannot guarantee the existence of a growth path with constant hours (and
therefore a constant value of eﬀective output), a very natural requirement to impose on any model
economy. As shown by King at al. (1988), given separability between consumption and leisure in
the period utility function, the restriction u(C)=l nC is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
the existence of a balanced growth path, which we deﬁne here as a stationary equilibrium in which
hours worked and the shares of income accruing to wages and proﬁts are bounded away from zero
and one. With this restriction, and in the absence of shocks,
f0(f−1(¯ YA))
¯ YAvh(f−1(¯ YA)) =
µpµw
1−τ
implicitly deﬁnes the constant level of eﬀective output along the balanced growth path, ¯ YA.
This expression also highlights how the presence of market power in the goods and labor markets,
together with distortionary taxation, drives a wedge between the marginal rates of substitution and
transformation of labor and consumption, whose equality characterizes the eﬃcient equilibrium.
To abstract from the role that monetary policy could (and optimally would) play in ameliorating
this ineﬃciency, we then assume that the ﬁscal authority subsidizes the sales of consumption goods
exactly enough to oﬀset the monopoly distortions, setting τ =1−µpµw (Rotemberg and Woodford,





By the second welfare theorem, as well as by simple inspection of (10), ¯ Yt ≡ At¯ YA, the eﬃcient level
of output, is seen to maximize the utility of the representative agent, given the resource constraint.
As a result, a linear approximation to the structural equilibrium relations will be all what is needed
to compute a second order accurate approximation to the utility of the representative agent, as
further illustrated in section 2.6.
11To complete the characterization of the balanced growth path we need only to remark that,
when output is equal to its eﬃcient level and At grows at the deterministic rate γ, equation (6)
implies that λAt ≡ βΛtPtAt = ¯ Y −1
A so that from (8) we obtain
¯ ι ≡ ln ¯ R = γ − lnβ + π
the value of the (continuously compounded) nominal interest rate along a growth path with steady
inﬂation at rate π.16
We now turn to the description of the equilibrium ﬂuctuations induced by the productivity
shocks, and of their interaction with the price setting frictions in the goods and labor markets. We
begin with the analysis of the demand side of the economy.
2.3 Demand
The demand side of the economy is completely characterized by a dynamic IS equation, which links
current expenditures to expectations of future real interest rates. This relation is obtained starting
from a log-linear approximation to the Euler equation (8) around the balanced growth path with
no inﬂation
ˆ λAt = Et
h













is the deviation of the nominal interest rate from its
steady state value, πt ≡ ln(Pt/Pt−1) is the inﬂation rate and ˆ γa
t ≡ γa
t − γ. We can then translate
this expression in terms of expenditures if we note that, with logarithmic utility, and deﬁning the




, (6) and (7) imply the approximate relation
xt = −Et−1ˆ λAt − (lnAt − Et−1 lnAt)
which together with (11) yields
xt = Et−1xt+1 − Et−1 [ˆ ıt − πt+1 − ˆ re
t] − (ˆ γa
t − Et−1ˆ γa
t) (12)
Here xt denotes the deviation of output from its eﬃcient level, our preferred notion of output gap,
while ˆ re
t ≡ Etˆ γa
t+1 is the real interest rate that would prevail under ﬂexible prices and without
informational delays, expressed in deviation from its value along the balanced growth path, ¯ ι.
Note that if we employed an alternative notion of the output gap, as the deviation of output from






the IS equation could be written in the simpler form
xn
t = Et−1xn
t+1 − (Et−1ˆ ıt − Et−1πt+1 − ˆ rn
t )
where now ˆ rn
t ≡ Et−1ˆ γa
t+1 is the familiar natural rate of interest. The reason for choosing the more
cumbersome formulation in (12) is that xt is the notion of output gap that is relevant for welfare
comparisons, as shown in section 2.6.
16 In what follows we will restrict our attention to the case π =0 .
12Another important characteristic of this demand formulation is that the output gap is not
part of the information set It−1 on which consumers base their decisions at time t. In fact, even
if expenditure demand is predetermined one period in advance, it is only with the realization of
the productivity shock at time t that the amount of hours needed to satisfy that level of demand,
and therefore the eﬃcient level of output, become known. As a result, the model exhibits the
realistic feature of an output gap whose exact realization is uncertain at the time at which agents
are required to take their decisions. Moreover, since only forecastable movements in the policy
instrument ˆ ıt have an eﬀect on the output gap at time t, the goal of output stabilization, although
desirable, cannot be perfectly achieved. The extent to which this inﬂuences the optimal policy is
one of the objects of our analysis in section 5.
2.4 Wage Setting
The wage setting mechanism is based on the random staggering device of Calvo (1983), modiﬁed to
accommodate indexation to productivity growth and decision lags. In particular, we assume that
every period a fraction 1−αw of outstanding labor contracts is randomly selected for renegotiation.
A fraction ˜ ψw of these new contracts is set on the basis of It−1 information and carries an initial
wage w1
t. The remaining contracts are set on the basis of It−2 information, with wage w2
t. In general,
this structure of delays has the objective of moderating the response of wages to shocks in the short
run, to bring it more in line with the available empirical evidence.17 H e r e ,i th a st h ea d d e db e n e ﬁt
of attributing a consistent information set to members of the same household operating in the goods
and labor markets.
We complete the characterization of the wage setting process describing the behavior of the
fraction αw of wages excluded from renegotiation. Similarly to Altig et al. (2002), we assume that
these wages are indexed to past price inﬂation and to productivity growth, so that a wage contract
j that is not renegotiated between t − 1 and t carries a wage wt (j) such that
lnwt (j)=l nwt−1 (j)+Ωt
where Ωt is deﬁned as
Ωt ≡ λwπt−1 + λγEt−1γa
t +( 1− λγ)γa
t−1
and λγ ∈ {0,1}. This means that, every quarter, besides being automatically increased by a fraction
λw of past quarter’s inﬂation, contractual wages are also allowed to incorporate an adjustment for
either past quarter’s observed productivity growth, or past quarter’s forecast of its current value.
The reasons for assuming this particular form of indexation are twofold. First, in a stochastic
equilibrium that exhibits stationary ﬂuctuations around a balanced growth path, real wages and
productivity need to be cointegrated. Given that under Calvo wage setting a positive fraction
17 The forward looking nature of standard optimizing models of pricing implies a front loaded response of prices
to forecastable movements in the fundamentals, as observed for example by Christiano et al. (2001). Information
delays help to moderate this eﬀect.
13of wages is not drawn for renegotiation for an arbitrarily large number of periods, contractual
indexation guarantees that those wages do not fall excessively out of line with the general level of
productivity. Second, consistency with the informational assumptions laid down so far requires that
wages be indexed to a measure of productivity included in the information set It−1. Our indexation
scheme considers two such measures, the expectation of the future value of productivity, Et−1γa
t,
and its latest available measurement, γa
t−1. A sw ew i l ls e e ,s o m eo fo u rr e s u l t sa r es e n s i t i v et o
the prevalent form of indexation, which explains why we propose a speciﬁcation that nests both
measures.





















provides a useful summary of the assumptions introduced so far. To determine the equilibrium
value of its components, we ﬁrst note that wages reoptimized in period t on the basis of t − 1
information, w1
t, are chosen to maximize the expected present discounted value of wage income,






















i st h ew a g er a t ea tt i m es, conditional on no renegotiation having







is the amount of labor demanded at that wage.
























(1 + νθw)ˆ w1










where ν = vhh¯ h
vh measures the curvature of the disutility of labor, φ−1 ≡
f0¯ h
f is the elasticity of the







t ≡ ln(Wt/Wt−1) − γ is the deviation of nominal wage
inﬂation from its steady state value, ˆ Ωt ≡ lnΩt − γ and ˆ ωAt ≡ ln(Wt/AtPt¯ ωA) is the percentage
deviation of the eﬀective real wage from its value on the balanced growth path




The ﬁrst order condition can then be solved for ˆ w1
t and, together with the fact that w2
t =
Et−2w1
t−1, and after some algebra, this is enough to characterize the evolution of the wage index.
This is usefully summarized by a wage Phillips curve of the form
˜ πw
t =( 1− ψw)Et−2˜ πw
t + ψwEt−1
£






1−˜ ψw(1−αw), κw,ξ w and ζw are positive coeﬃcients, ˜ πw
t ≡ ˆ πw
t −Et−2ˆ Ωt is the deviation
of wage inﬂation from the forecastable component of its index and Φt ≡ ˆ Ωt −Et−2ˆ Ωt is its forecast
error.18 According to this equation, deviations of wage inﬂation from the value that would be
predicted on the basis of indexation alone are a function of the expected future values of the
eﬀective wage level and of the output gap. The latter serves as a proxy for the amount of hours
that workers expect to supply at the posted wage, and for the marginal disutility thereof.
The fact that in this class of models with indexation the resulting Phillips curve is conveniently
expressed in terms of deviations of inﬂation from its index is familiar from Woodford (2002). In this
particular example, we used instead the deviation ˜ πw
t from the forecast because this is the notion
of wage inﬂation that is relevant for welfare comparisons, as shown in section 2.6. Note however
that even if we adopted the more conventional deviation ˆ πw
t − ˆ Ωt, we would still need to append a
“shock” term similar to Φt to the resulting wage setting relation.
2.5 Price Setting
The price setting process in the goods’ market has the same basic structure described above, except
that contractually ﬁxed prices are now assumed to be partially indexed only to past observed
inﬂation. Therefore, a price pt (z) that is not drawn for reoptimization at time t is updated as
lnpt (z)=l npt−1 (z)+λpπt−1
Moreover, we maintain the assumption that a fraction ˜ ψp of the prices to be reoptimized each
period is chosen on the basis of time t−1 information, while the remaining 1− ˜ ψp prices are based



























P r i c e sr e o p t i m i z e do nt h eb a s i so fIt−1 information,p 1
t, are chosen to maximize the expected
































is the level of demand for a good whose price has not been reoptimized between times t and s. The






























18 The details of the calculations, which follow very closely the steps illustrated in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998),
are collected in an Appendix that is available from the author upon request. The values of the coeﬃcients that appear
in the log-linearized supply block, equations 13 and 15, are collected in table 4.






















f02 is the elasticity of the real marginal cost function with respect to output, holding
wages ﬁxed, and ˜ πt ≡ πt − λpπt−1 is the deviation of price inﬂation from its index.
As before, manipulation of the ﬁrst order condition and of the expression for the price index





Et−2˜ πt + ψpEt−1
£
κpxt + ξpˆ ωAt + β˜ πt+1
¤
(15)
where ψp is deﬁned analogously to ψw and ξp and κp are positive coeﬃcients. This equation relates
t h ea m o u n to fi n ﬂation in excess of automatic indexation to the expected future values of the
output gap and the eﬀective real wage. These terms reﬂect in turn the two basic components of the
marginal cost, one capturing the eﬀect of higher output demand on the eﬃciency of the marginal
input, the other measuring its unit cost. Diﬀerently from the wage equation 13, this relation is not
perturbed by terms like Φt because the amount of the automatic indexation for prices is perfectly
forecastable on the basis of information dated t − 2. This also accounts for the diﬀerent deﬁnition
of the inﬂation deviation ˜ πt.
2.6 The Welfare Criterion
As already pointed out in section 2.1, the availability of a complete set of ﬁnancial markets, provid-
ing households with perfect insulation from idiosyncratic income ﬂuctuations, implies the existence
of a representative consumer. Nevertheless, since the source of those ﬂuctuations is the realized
frequency with which wages can be reoptimized, diﬀerent households still experience heterogenous
employment histories, and therefore diﬀerent levels of ex-post utility. It seems then natural to
compare the performance of diﬀerent monetary policies on the basis of their eﬀect on the utility of













Following Woodford (2002), this section sketches the main steps in the derivation of a second
order expansion to this utility function. Given ﬁrst order accuracy of the log-linearized constraints
under which monetary policy is conducted, this approximation guarantees that, given a sequence of
economies ordered by progressively tighter bounds ||ε|| on the amplitude of the exogenous shocks,
policies that appear to be better under the approximate criterion, indeed deliver higher levels of
utility for the representative agent in economies far enough along the sequence.19










+l n¯ YAAt = ˆ YAt + t.i.p. (16)
where we used the fact that consumption is the only source of demand in the model (i.e. Ct = Yt)
and that the exogenous term ln ¯ YAAt does not alter the preference ranking of alternative paths
for the endogenous variables, hence the notation t.i.p. (term independent of policy). As for the
disutility of labor, we have
R 1
0 v(ht(j))dj = vh¯ h
½
Ejˆ ht (j)+1















is the percentage deviation of total demand for “skill” j from its steady
state value. With a fair amount of algebra, this expression can be turned into
R 1




ˆ YAt + 1
2 (1 + ω) ˆ Y 2
At + 1
2 (1 + ωpθp)θpVarzˆ pt (z)+1
2 (1 + νθw)θwφ−1Varj ˆ wt (j)
o













2 (1 + ω) ˆ Y 2
At + 1
2 (1 + ωpθp)θpVarzˆ pt (z)+1
2 (1 + νθw)θwφ−1Varj ˆ wt (j)
o
Three important points emerge from this approximation. First, even though we wrote the






ˆ YAt,t h ee ﬃciency of the balanced growth
path maintained by ﬁscal policy implies the equality of the marginal rates of substitution and
transformation, vh¯ YA = f0, so that in fact this term is equal to zero. In other words, movements
away from the optimum–which coincides with the eﬃcient equilibrium by the second welfare
theorem–do not change the level of utility of the representative agent, up to ﬁrst order. This
is the reason why a ﬁrst order approximation to the equilibrium ﬂuctuations in the endogenous
v a r i a b l e si ss u ﬃcient to compute a second order approximation to Ut. If the ﬁrst order term in
the expansion of Ut received a positive weight, second order terms in the approximation of the
equilibrium dynamics would generate terms of the same order in the expansion, and could therefore
not be omitted. Assuming that ﬁscal policy eliminates the ﬁrst order ineﬃciency generated by
monopolistic competition avoids this further complication.
Second, utility depends on the deviations of output Yt from its eﬃcient level At¯ YA, the notion
of output gap that was proposed in section 2.3 and that appears in the pricing relations derived
above. The reason for this is simple. Agent’s utility is decreasing in the amount of hours worked,
which in turn depends on the level of eﬀective demand Yt/At. It is then ﬂuctuations in this variable
that are going to reduce households’ welfare.
Third, the other fundamental source of welfare losses is the distortion associated with price
and wage dispersion. As shown in appendix A, this dispersion can be expressed as a function of
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and the weights are deﬁned in the appendix. Note that in the loss function Lt the level of price
dispersion is related to the deviations of price and wage inﬂation from their indexes, as deﬁned in
sections 2.5 and 2.4. This should come as no surprise, since if indexation were the only source of
price changes, no price dispersion would result.
2.7 Monetary Policy
This section completes the description of the macroeconomic environment with a discussion of
the operations of the monetary authority. A ﬁrst important point in this respect is that, given
the negligible role of money balances in this economy, monetary policy is eﬀective only through
the impact of interest rate changes on agents’ willingness to substitute their consumption over
time. Moreover, because of the informational delays that characterize demand behavior, only the
forecastable component of the nominal interest rate has an impact on their spending decisions, as
it is evident from Euler equation (12). This implies that, even if the policy authority could collect
information with no delay, incorporating this information in its decisions would simply increase
the volatility of its instrument, with no other discernible eﬀect on the economy. We will therefore
assume that the central bank refrains from exploiting this information, or equivalently, and more
realistically, that it shares the same information processing deﬁciencies as the private sector. As
already pointed out, this includes in any case imperfect information on the state of productivity.
As for the authority’s procedures to set its instrument, we consider three possible alternatives.
The ﬁrst is that the central bank targets one of three endogenous variables, price inﬂation, wage
inﬂation or (its forecast of) the output gap. Rather than for their prescriptive content, we consider
these policies because they represent useful benchmarks to which to compare the optimal equilib-
rium. Note also that strict output gap targeting is not within the central bank’s menu of available
choices due to the one period delay with which demand reacts to changes in the policy instrument.
The second alternative is that interest rate policy is set according to a feedback rule of the form





with parameters ﬁxed at the values estimated by Clarida et al. (2000) in a closely related model and
s u m m a r i z e di nt a b l e6 .W et a k et h i sr u l et or e p r e sent a reasonable approximation to actual U.S.
monetary policy and use it to generate the simulated impulse responses that will be compared to
those estimated from the data. Finally, we consider the state contingent policy that maximizes the
unconditional expectation of the intertemporal loss function (17), under the constraint represented
by the model’s dynamics.20
20 The exact formulation of the problem and the fundamental steps in its solution can be found in appendix C.
Giannoni and Woodford (2002) contains a detailed discussion of the reasons for and implications of considering the
unconditional expectation in the optimal policy problem.
18Note also that, in all our experiments, we are going to report the values of the losses associated
with diﬀerent policies and/or diﬀerent models in terms of an “inﬂation equivalent” (Dennis and
Söderström, 2002), deﬁned as the amount of steady inﬂation that agents would be willing to accept





and is reported in our ﬁgures as an annualized percentage.
2.8 Calibration
The calibration of the model’s parameters, summarized in tables 2 to 5, is based on the estimates
of Amato and Laubach (2002), with two important exceptions. The ﬁrst regards the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption. This coeﬃcient, estimated at (.26)
−1 by Amato and
Laubach (2002), is ﬁxed here at one, the standard value in the real business cycle literature, because
of the restriction on utility imposed by the presence of long run growth. This discrepancy is due
to the fact that, in this class of models, aggregate consumption is usually interpreted as overall
private expenditure, a composite with a much higher sensitivity to interest rate changes than simple
non-durable consumption (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). Therefore, in our calibration a given
adjustment of the policy instrument has a smaller impact on the level of demand than what is
more commonly assumed, a diﬀerence that should be taken into consideration when interpreting
the simulated impulse responses. The second exception regards the assumed degree of stickiness of
prices and wages, which the benchmark calibration ﬁxes at the values estimated by ACEL.21
To calibrate the productivity parameters, we start by noting that the Wold representation of
the state space process in equation (2) can be written as
(1 − ρL)ˆ γa
t =( 1− θL)εt (19)
with θ = ρ − K and Var(εt)=σ2
a + P, where K and P are the steady state gain and MSE of
the Kalman ﬁlter for (2).22 The fundamental disturbance εt would then be the structural shock
identiﬁed by ACEL’s long run restriction if (2) were the true data generating process, as this is
the shock inducing the observed unit root in average productivity. Since one of the aims of our
positive analysis is to compare our model’s impulse responses to those in ACEL, we ﬁrst restrict
the parameters of (19) to match the moments of the productivity process estimated there. Note
though that since ACEL assume productivity growth to follow a simple AR(1) process, we are still
missing one restriction, which we can think of as providing information on the “signal to noise
ratio” η ≡ σγ/σa. To obtain this information we then turn to available empirical estimates of state
space models of productivity, like those in Roberts (2001) and French (2001).
21 The main reason for favoring the estimates of ACEL is that Amato and Laubach (2002) restrict the two
coeﬃcients to be the same in their estimation procedure. This restriction is particularly questionable given the
evidence in Christiano et al. (2001) that points to wage stickiness as the key nominal friction.
22See Hamilton (1994, pg. ???) and appendix B for more details.
19More speciﬁcally, we proceed as follows. First, we match ACEL’s estimated autocorrelation
coeﬃcient of 0.8 with the one that would be obtained by ﬁtting an AR(1) process to data generated
by (19). This produces a value for ρ of 0.93. Second, we choose the scale of εt so that the long
run eﬀect on output of a one standard deviation shock to εt matches the VAR estimate of 0.6%
(see ﬁgure 1). This results in an overall volatility of the growth rate of productivity of 0.735%,
extremely close to the 0.763% found by Prescott (1986) in estimates based on the Solow residual and
that is often used as a benchmark in the real business cycle literature (see for example Cooley and
Prescott, 1995). Finally, we calibrate η to reproduce the Kalman gain implicit in Roberts’ (2001)
baseline estimates, which are based on a model of labor productivity of the same form as (2), but
in which γt is assumed to follow a random walk. This results in a value of η of 14%. The reason for
following this procedure, rather than for example directly matching the estimated signal to noise
ratio, is that the gain provides more direct evidence on agents’ learning speed. In fact, in Roberts’
(2001) I(2) speciﬁcation, K measures exactly the fraction of each observed change in productivity
growth that the Kalman ﬁlter attributes to its trend, rather than to its transitory component.
Moreover, everything else being equal, reducing the persistence of γt reduces the updating speed,
while the opposite eﬀect follows from an increase in the signal to noise ratio. With ρ =0 .93 then,
our parametrization requires a value of η higher than Roberts’ (2001) 8% to reproduce the same
gain. To the extent that a low signal to noise ratio helps the model to generate a decline in inﬂation
then, this procedure yields a more conservative estimate of this parameter, in the sense of making
it less likely to spuriously produce the desired results. In any event, given the importance of this
parameter for the transmission of productivity shocks to costs and inﬂation, we also checked the
robustness of our simulations across a fairly wide range of alternative values. According to these
experiments, the paper’s main results are not aﬀected by values of η of up to 50%, which we consider
well above the range of reasonable values for this parameter.
To provide a visual illustration of the eﬀect of this calibration on the persistence of the trend
shocks and on the learning speed, ﬁgure 2 displays impulse responses of the actual and forecasted
values of γa
t to the shocks, under full and partial information. As we can see, the relatively low
value of η results in a very gradual movement of the forecast and in a fairly persistent forecast
error, which only disappears after approximately ﬁve years.
3 The Transmission of Productivity Shocks
Having introduced the central features of the model, we now turn to the analysis of its equilibrium
behavior. In this section, we begin by considering the case of a monetary authority that sets
its instrument according to a deterministic policy rule. This allows us to study the transmission
mechanism of the productivity shocks built into the behavior of the private sector, and to highlight
the role of imperfect information in this mechanism. Then, in section 5, we analyze the optimal
policy problem and compare its solution to the prescriptions of some simple targeting rules. We
20will show that, even if in the optimum the output gap is nearly stabilized, this does not result in
as t a b l ei n ﬂation rate. Quite to the contrary, policies that stabilize inﬂation produce undesirable
welfare outcomes. Finally, in sections 4 and 6, we compare the model’s predictions to the observed
evolution of some key macroeconomic variables during two much discussed episodes of the recent
past, the seventies’ productivity slowdown and the speedup of the last decade.
In what follows, we will mainly focus our attention on the model’s dynamic responses to persis-
tent shifts in the growth rate of productivity. We do this for two reasons. First, from a theoretical
perspective, these changes generate the kind of misperception of actual production possibilities
that, according to our reasoning, should moderate wage demands and cause them to trail realized
productivity. We argued that it is through this channel that a surge in productivity growth might
result in lower inﬂation. Second, from the empirical point of view, these shocks closely ﬁtt h e
description of the productivity disturbances that hit the U.S. economy in the 1970s and 1990s.
However, when comparing the simulated impulse responses to those identiﬁed through VAR-based
long run restrictions, we need to take into account that such restrictions can only recover a lin-
ear combination of the model’s structural shocks, the “unconditional” disturbance εt in the Wold
representation of equation (19). Therefore, for the purpose of that comparison, the model will be
perturbed with this particular disturbance, rather than with the theoretically more interesting, but
unobservable, trend shock ε
γ
t .
Ideally, to isolate the role of private behavior in the transmission of shocks, we would like to de-
scribe their dynamic eﬀects controlling for any systematic response of policy to observed economic
conditions. Given the general equilibrium nature of our model though, in which today’s choices
depend not only on past conditions, but also on expectations, this is clearly impossible. In other
words, there is no obvious “neutral” policy stance whereby the monetary authority can be usefully
thought of as “doing nothing”, since deﬁning a rational expectation equilibrium requires to specify
some (possibly state contingent) rule of conduct for the central bank. This task is further compli-
cated by the well-known indeterminacy issues that are typical of this class of models (Woodford,
2002). In particular, a peg of the interest rate to any exogenous quantity, like its steady state
level, or the exogenously ﬂuctuating natural rate of interest, would result in indeterminacy of the
rational expectations equilibrium, therefore ruling out these policies as candidate implementations
of a neutral policy stance. As a second best alternative then, we consider a simple class of targeting
rules, whose objective is simply to stabilize one of the endogenous variables in the system. As such,
these policies do not involve explicit feedback from the economy, which might in turn obscure the
direct impact of the productivity shock on private behavior.
Equilibrium dynamics in the benchmark model To introduce the basic features of the
model’s equilibrium, ﬁgure 3 displays impulse responses of the key endogenous variables to a positive
s h o c kt ot h et r e n dg r o w t hr a t eo fp r o d u c t i v i t y ,g i v en a policy that stabilizes the one period ahead
forecast of the output gap, i.e. Et−1xt =0 . The shock is realized at time t =1and is assumed
21to increase the growth rate of productivity by one percentage point. The impulse responses of the
actual and forecasted productivity growth to this particular shock are depicted in ﬁgure 2, under full
and partial information.23 Starting from the upper right corner of the ﬁgure, we observe that the
response of the output gap is a properly scaled mirror image of the persistent forecast error incurred
by agents trying to predict the future growth rate, the diﬀerence between the continuous and dashed
lines in the right panel of ﬁgure 2. This follows immediately from equation (12), which implies
xt − Et−1xt = −(ˆ γa
t − Et−1ˆ γa
t) and therefore xt = −(ˆ γa
t − Et−1ˆ γa
t), given that policy maintains
Et−1xt =0 . In economic terms, with demand predetermined at time t − 1, an unexpected increase
in productivity decreases the amount of labor that ﬁrms need to hire to satisfy that demand, thus
also decreasing the output gap.24 Lower labor demand and wage setters’ conservative estimates of
the persistence of the shock restrain the response of wage inﬂation, which translates in turn into a
fairly pronounced deﬂation in the price of consumption. Finally, this equilibrium is accompanied by
a decline in the gap between the nominal interest rate and the natural rate of interest, which is our
measure of the nominal stance of policy. Note however from the approximate Euler equation that
stabilization of the expected output gap implies that the forecastable component of the real interest
rate, Et−1 [it − Etπt+1], is equal to the natural rate, implying a zero (expected) real interest rate
gap. This also conﬁrms that output gap targeting can in some sense be considered a reasonable
approximation to a “neutral” policy.
The role of informational frictions As a further illustration of the role of informational
frictions in the model’s equilibrium dynamics, ﬁgure 4 displays impulse responses to the trend
shock across several diﬀerent models, which incorporate various combinations of those frictions.
More speciﬁcally, the thick dashed line (denoted by ALp-F-s in the legend) represents an extremely
simpliﬁed version of our model, with no decision delays, full information and indexation of contrac-
tual wages to the observed contemporaneous growth rate of productivity. This model is included
in the simulations as a normative benchmark, since under this speciﬁcation a policy that targets
the (now observable) output gap can attain the unconstrained optimum; it also represents the
most direct extension of the standard model of section 1.1 to our non stationary environment. The
dashed-dotted line (ALp-F) depicts the responses of a model that reintroduces the decision delays,
and indexation to past productivity, but maintains the observability of all productivity shocks.
This last assumption is then dropped in the model represented by the continuous thin line (ALp-
P). Finally, the thick continuous line represents our baseline speciﬁcation, with partial information
and indexation of wages to forecasted productivity growth. Note also that the simulations assume
that policy follows the Volcker-Greenspan interest rate rule, which we argued is an empirically
23 At this stage, the choice of the shock’s size is only a normalization, since we are not yet in the position of
quantitatively comparing simulated and empirical impulse responses. This comparison is undertaken in ﬁgure 5, in
which the model is perturbed by the unconditional shock εt.
24 Recall that in this simple model, with labor as the only input and no other shocks besides those to productivity,
the output gap is a monotonic transormation of hours. In the log-linear approximation considered here this relation
is ˆ Ht = φxt.
22satisfactory representation of actual policy in the last twenty years.
As it is evident from the ﬁgure, the combination of our assumptions produces a model in which
the response of nominal wage inﬂa t i o nt oas u r g ei np r o d u c t i v i t yi ss i g n i ﬁcantly dampened with
respect to all the other speciﬁcations. This implies in turn that, while in those models the response
of inﬂation is either close to zero or signiﬁcantly positive, in our benchmark speciﬁcation inﬂation
takes a fairly pronounced and persistent dip. Note in particular that the standard model predicts a
sizable positive jump in inﬂation, which is caused by a loose monetary policy and accompanied by an
initial response of nominal wage inﬂation that ampliﬁes the 1% impulse originated by the increase
in productivity growth. Moreover, the ﬁgure illustrates that the assumption that informational
delays also aﬀect the wage indexation process, once interacted with partial information, provides
the key added value in explaining the decline in inﬂation. It is in fact only moving from the thin
to the thick continuos line that inﬂation is seen to turn negative after the positive shock. This
is because indexing wages to past observed productivity, as in the thin line, would undo most of
the sluggishness in newly set wages generated by workers’ errors in forecasting future productivity
growth. This consideration is especially relevant in quantitative terms under our calibration, in
which 78% of wages are subject to indexation every period. Ultimately, what assumption represents
a more accurate depiction of reality remains an empirical question, which is not the objective
of this paper to investigate. Nevertheless, at least when judged in terms of its macroeconomic
implications, indexation to forecasted productivity produces results that are clearly more in line
with the evidence, explaining our preference for this speciﬁcation.
Further clues on the eﬀect of the model’s informational frictions on the transmission of pro-
ductivity shocks come from the evolution of the variables depicted in the last line of ﬁgure 4.
These variables represent the fundamental determinants of price and wage inﬂation identiﬁed by
the Phillips curves (13) and (15), namely the “long horizon forecasts” of unit labor costs (ωAt) and





∀t along the horizon of the impulse response simulation, with zt =l n Wt
AtPt or xt. Note that these
forecasts are scaled by diﬀerent coeﬃcients in the two Phillips curves, but their dynamic evolution
is captured entirely by expression (20). The responses of these two variables, which reﬂect the
unfolding of agents’ uncertainty about the productivity shock, provide a more complete picture
of the role of learning in the equilibrium dynamics than the ex-post real wage and output gap
evolution described above. First of all, we observe that partial information has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the forecasts of future labor costs, as suggested by our intuition. This eﬀect does not translate
into a more pronounced deﬂation because in the benchmark model agents also expect a sizable
and persistent surge in the output gap. The expectation of positive gaps compensates at least
in part the expected decline in labor costs, contributing to restrain the deﬂationary eﬀects of the
productivity shock. This suggests that a richer demand speciﬁcation, that included for example
23habits in consumption (Fuhrer, 2000; Christiano et al., 2001), by further smoothing the response
of the output gap, might induce a more pronounced dip in inﬂation. This would in turn contribute
to bringing the model’s dynamics even closer to the data, in which the decline in inﬂation appears
quantitatively more pronounced, as we will see in the empirical comparison below. We leave the
quantitative exploration of this eﬀect for future research.
Empirical performance Our analysis so far has been limited to considering the model’s
impulse responses to a trend productivity shock, since we argued that this is the theoretically
more interesting case. As we already had the chance to remark though, these responses cannot
be compared with those estimated by ACEL and reported in ﬁgure 1, because their VAR identiﬁ-
cation procedure, under the null represented by our model, would only isolate a particular linear
combination of the model’s two structural shocks, namely the unconditional shock εt.in the Wold
representation of equation (19). Nevertheless, given the distribution of those shocks, we can still
simulate the eﬀect of an impulse to εt, making the exercise consistent with ACEL’s empirical ex-
periment. Note also that, for the purpose of the quantitative comparison between the model and
the data, the scale of the shocks is of course important. As indicated in section 2.8, this is chosen
so that the unconditional shock’s long run eﬀect on the level of output is equal to the 0.6% esti-
mated in the VAR (see ﬁgure 1), a choice that implies a standard deviation of the growth rate of
productivity very closely in line with standard values in the literature.
The ﬁndings of this experiment are illustrated in ﬁgure 5, which compares the same four models
presented above, now under the empirically realistic assumption that monetary policy follows the
Volcker-Greenspan interest rate rule. Starting with the upper row of the table, we immediately note
that our preferred speciﬁcation (the thick continuous line) is the only one to produce the negative
correlation between output and inﬂation responses that is a clear feature of the VAR estimates.
Moreover, the proﬁle of the two responses is very similar to that depicted in ﬁgure 1. Output
jumps by approximately 0.4% in the period immediately following the shock (recall that output is
predetermined in the model), with only a small adjustment from there to its new long run level.
Inﬂation reaches its trough response of slightly more than −0.2% two quarters after the shock,
and adjusts back from there in less than two years. In the VAR point estimates, the maximum
response happens on impact and is closer to −0.6%, but the subsequent adjustment back to steady
state is similarly sharp. Moreover, the simulated impulse responses ﬁt easily within the VAR 95%
conﬁdence bands represented by the shaded area, with the only exception of the impact response.
As for the rest of the variables, the model is fairly successful in replicating the behavior of real
wages, that exhibit a smoother proﬁle than the other real variables, and of consumption, that in
our model is simply equal to output. The federal funds rate on the contrary is predicted to fall in
the model, while the VAR point estimates show it rising, but the model’s prediction is comfortably
inside the estimated conﬁdence intervals. Finally, looking at the response of average hours in the
last panel, we see that in the model they decline on impact, but then jump immediately to a positive
24level, from which they adjust (almost) monotonically towards their steady state. Note that this
is broadly in line with the estimated proﬁle, except that there the peak response is only reached
after one year, and hours actually never turn negative, at least according to the point estimates.
Interestingly, this discrepancy with ACEL’s estimates brings our model more in line with several
other VAR studies, in which hours are found to decline in response to an identiﬁed technology
shock (see for example Galí, 1999 and Francis and Ramey, 2001), and whose results have raised
some doubts on the empirical relevance of standard RBC models.
As already pointed out, the initial dip in hours depends on the unexpected increase in labor
productivity, coupled with a predetermined level of demand. This points in turn to what is perhaps
the main weakness of the model, at least when observed through the lens of its responses to
productivity shocks. One notable characteristic of the empirical impulse responses is in fact that
most variables jump immediately in response to the identiﬁed technology shock. Some of them, like
inﬂation, return monotonically to their steady state value, while others, like output, consumption
and the real wage are either constant after an initial jump, or slowly increase towards their new
steady state level. In the model on the other hand, even if the overall proﬁle of the responses is very
close to the VAR’s, the initial response is constrained to be zero. This depends in turn on the fact
that this class of models was originally devised to match estimated responses to monetary policy
shocks. In particular, the informational delays that prevent the endogenous variables from jumping
on impact originate from the identifying assumption, common to recursive monetary VARs, that
decision variables do not react to changes in policy within the quarter. As it is clear from ﬁgure
1, the estimated responses to technology shocks show that this assumption is not quite compatible
with the behavior of those variables under all circumstances, and that more research is needed to
reconcile these observations.25
4 The New Economy and The Productivity Slowdown
The extraordinary performance of the U.S. economy in the second half of the 1990s, with its
unprecedented combination of rapid GDP growth, low unemployment and moderate inﬂation, and
the contemporaneous surge in labor productivity to levels not seen for more than two decades,
have attracted a great deal of attention among scholars, policy makers and the public.26 In the
midst of the excitement about these developments, some observers hailed the arrival of a “New
Economy”, whose most thaumaturgic virtues were promptly disposed of by the recession of 2001.
In the meantime however, the acceleration of productivity, the fundamental underpinning of most
moderate views of the New Economy, has become a well documented fact, whose quantitative
scope has survived the recent recession virtually untouched.27 As extensively documented above,
25 Woodford (2002a) presents a model that can in principle accomodate these diﬀerent patterns of reaction to
diﬀerent shocks.
26 See for example Gordon (2002), Jorgenson (2001), Oliner and Sichel (2000) and the references therein.
27 The average growth rate of labor productivity from 1948 to the second quarter of 2002 was 2.25%. It was 2.8%
from 1948 to 1973, 1.45% from 1973 to 1995 and 2.4% from 1995 to 2002:II (data are from the latest available release
25the model proposed in this paper has the potential to generate falling inﬂation and high growth
rates against the backdrop of a persistent increase in the growth rate of labor productivity, precisely
the combination of macroeconomic conditions registered in the U.S. in the nineties. It is still an
open question though if the model can quantitatively account for the evolution of these variables
during that episode.
Answering this question requires ﬁrst to take a stance on a reasonable chronology for the
unfolding of the shock in the data. This task is considerably simpliﬁed for the period under study
by the fact that 1995 is generally recognized as a year in which the US economy was close to a
steady state (see for example Meyer, 2001), while it was in 1996 that the ﬁrst signs of a possible
productivity revival started to emerge. We therefore chose the twenty quarters from 1996:I to
2000:IV as the relevant period for our “case study”, under the assumption that the “New Economy
shock” hit the U.S. in the ﬁrst quarter of 1996 and its eﬀects unfolded over the subsequent ﬁve
years.
This reconstruction is corroborated for instance by the sequence of testimonies by Chairman
Alan Greenspan accompanying the Federal Reserve Board’s semiannual monetary policy report
to the Congress.28 The ﬁrst cautious references to a surge in productivity can be found in the
testimony of February 1997, in which we read that “faster productivity growth last year meant
that rising compensation gains did not cause labor costs per unit of output to increase any more
rapidly”, but it is not until July 1997 that the Fed starts referring to this faster growth as potentially
persistent: “although the anecdotal evidence is ample and manufacturing productivity has picked
up, a change in the underlying trend is not yet reﬂected in our conventional data for the whole
economy.” A further step in the updating of the Fed’s trend estimates can be detected in July
1998, when Greenspan reports that “evidence continues to mount that the trend of productivity
has accelerated, even if the extent of that pickup is as yet unclear.” Finally, in July 1999 the
Chairman declares that “to date, 1999 has been an exceptional year for the American economy
(...). At the root of this impressive expansion of economic activity has been a marked acceleration
in the productivity of our nation’s workforce.”
Note that this sequence of progressively more sanguine statements about the nature of the
measured changes in productivity is in accordance with the informational assumptions of our model,
according to which policy makers, as well as the public, update their estimates of the persistent
component of productivity only gradually over time. Whether the assumed distribution of the
productivity factor in the model is also a reasonable characterization of the stochastic properties
of the “true” New Economy shock is indeed impossible to ascertain, either from these statements,
or from the data, if we assume, as it seems realistic, that the econometrician shares the same
information of the agents in the model. The main source of concern in this respect is indeed the
degree of persistence of the growth rate shock. The fact that the surge in labor productivity growth
that we traced to the beginning of 1996 has not yet signiﬁcantly subsided suggests that the initial
(Septembr 5th, 2002) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
28 Testimonies and Reports from 1996 to 2002 can be found at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/.
26shock might have been even more persistent than what implied by our calibration. But then again,
another persistent shock, or maybe a sequence of transitory shocks, might have hit productivity in
the meantime. Trying to discriminate among these alternative scenarios is beyond the scope of the
present case study, which therefore simply retains the model’s distributional assumptions.
Another key ingredient of this study is the magnitude of the productivity shock to be simulated.
To calibrate this quantity, we followed the same procedure used to calibrate the “average” shock
considered in section 3. First, we computed the long run impact of the New Economy shock in the
data. The average growth rate of output between 1948:I and 1995:IV was 3.39%, but increased to
3.95% between 1996:I and 2000:IV. Compounded over these ﬁve years, the extra 56 basis points
of annual growth result in a level of output at the end of the period that is 3.36% higher than
what it would have been under average growth.29 Assuming that this extra income can be entirely
attributed to the acceleration in productivity, this implies an initial shock of approximately 1.2%
at an annual rate. Note that even if this number is approximately three times the estimated
standard deviation of the permanent shock, making this event highly unlikely, at least on a normal
distribution, the growth rate of labor productivity in the U.S. did jump from an average of 1.5%
in the period 1973-1995 to an average of 2.5% between 1996 and 2000.
The dynamics of labor productivity, output growth and inﬂation predicted by the model in
response to the technology shock described above are reported in ﬁgure 6, along with their observed
counterparts, as dashed and continuous lines respectively, under the assumption that monetary
policy follows the Volcker-Greenspan estimated interest rate rule. Considering that the continuous
lines simply represent the raw data, and that no special eﬀort has been directed at specifying and
calibrating the model to match those data, we think that the model captures the broad features
of this episode remarkably well. In particular, the model closely matches the dynamics of average
labor productivity, with the exception of the last few quarters, in which the monotonic decay of the
dashed line falls short of what looks very much like a further resurgence of productivity, similar to
that observed at the beginning of the sample. This discrepancy is reﬂected in turn in the behavior of
output growth, that is more persistent in the data than what is predicted by the AR(1) decay built
into the model. Similar considerations also apply to inﬂation, which declines by a full percentage
point in the data, but by only half that much according to the simulation.
We should probably remark at this point that it is far from the spirit of the exercise to assess
the “ﬁt” of the model according to any formal criterion. It is therefore quite useful, also to provide
some perspective on the previous results, to ask how the model compares with observations on
the period following the seventies’ productivity slowdown, which we date to the third quarter of
1973.30 Following the same procedure described above, the simulated paths for the variables are
generated by a shock whose long run eﬀect on output matches that measured in the data.31 As we
29 Recall that the shock considered in the simulations in ﬁgure 5 resulted in a long run eﬀect on the level of output
of 0.6%.
30 French (2001) conducts Andrews tests on the growth rate of TFP and ﬁn d sas i g n i ﬁcant break in 1973:III.
However, our results are not overly sensitive to the choice of another break date around this period.
31 The average growth rate of GDP between 1948:II and 1973:II was 3.89%, and slowed to 2.73% in the period
27can see from ﬁgure 7, although the model predicts inﬂation and real activity to move in the right
direction, the amplitude of their observed ﬂuctuations is orders of magnitude wider than in the
model. Interestingly however, the simulation correctly identiﬁes the dates of the peak responses
in both inﬂation and output growth, and is fairly closet ot h eo b s e r v a t i o n si nt h el a s tp a r to ft h e
sample.
We interpret these results as suggesting that it is reasonable to ascribe the macroeconomic
events of the second half of the nineties almost exclusively to the eﬀects of the productivity speedup.
On the other hand, the seventies’ productivity slowdown emerges as a plausible, but quantitatively
incomplete explanation for the period’s stagﬂation. The extent to which these results are inﬂuenced
by our representation of monetary policy, and in particular how the model’s optimal equilibrium
compares to the observed ﬂuctuations are questions that we defer until section 6.
5 Optimal Policy
Having established that our model provides a reasonably accurate depiction of the transmission
of productivity shocks, we are now ready to tackle the normative question posed by the paper’s
title. In particular, we wish to investigate the nature of the equilibrium ﬂuctuations that minimize
the welfare loss of the representative agent and the path of the policy instrument that implements
them. We are also going to compare this optimal equilibrium with the ones that would emerge
under some of the simple policy rules introduced in section 2.7, to gain further insights into the
propagation of productivity shocks and the properties of the optimal policy. We leave instead for
further research the question of implementation of the optimal policy and the systematic analysis
of simple rules that might approximate this policy.
Optimal policy response to unconditional shocks We begin the normative analysis from
ﬁgure 8, which considers impulse responses of the endogenous variables to the unconditional shock
in the Wold representation of equation (19). We can thus compare the optimal responses both to
those obtained under the Volcker-Greenspan interest rate rule, and to the VAR estimates, which
are reported in ﬁgures 5 and 1 respectively. In our preferred model (the thick line), a drop in the
nominal interest rate that more than compensates for the increase in the natural rate of interest
i sa c c o m p a n i e db yas u r g ei nd e m a n d ,d e ﬂation in the price of consumption goods and virtually
no change in the nominal wage. The comparison with the other speciﬁcations illustrates how
the deﬂationary eﬀect of the productivity shock, which is one of the deﬁning characteristics of our
model, and of the data, aides the monetary authority’s attempt at balancing the ﬂuctuations in price
and wage inﬂation. With the exception of the simplest model (the dashed line), in which optimal
policy actually achieves the unconstrained optimum, the monetary authority responds to the shock
by turning distinctly contractionary. This results in a drop in demand, which together with the
1973:III to 1978:II, resulting in a long run eﬀect on output of -6.84%.
28higher labor productivity produces a steep and persistent reduction in hours. These adjustments
in the real variables are indeed just an instrument through which the monetary authority reaches
its objective of minimizing a combination of price and wage dispersion. All models display in
fact similar degrees of price deﬂation and a reduction in wage inﬂation with respect for example
to the corresponding equilibria illustrated in ﬁgure 5. In conclusion, ﬁgure 8 clearly illustrates
how the transmission mechanism embedded in the benchmark model, which we argued is a better
representation of reality than more standard sticky price models, has very distinctive implications
for the desirable monetary policy response to productivity shocks and for the resulting equilibrium
ﬂuctuations in the endogenous variables.
Optimal policy response to trend shocks Turning now our attention to the optimal
policy responses to the trend shock ε
γ
t , ﬁgure 9 presents the simulated dynamics of the endogenous
variables, together with those of the target variables identiﬁed by the approximate welfare criterion
(18), namely the forecastable and unforcastable components of wage and price inﬂation, expressed
in deviation from their respective indexes.32 We can note immediately that the main source of
ineﬃciency in the models in which wages are assumed to be indexed to past productivity growth
(the thin continuous and dashed-dotted lines) comes from the behavior of wage inﬂation, which
compounds high volatility of both its forecastable and unforcastable components. In the attempt
to curb this volatility, optimal policy maintains a contractionary stance, inducing a recession that
has the eﬀect of moderating workers’ wage demands. As a by-product, the recession also produces
a drop in price inﬂation. This explains why it is not desirable to reach for the monetary breaks
even more decisively. Such a policy would in fact reduce the welfare losses stemming from wage
ﬂuctuations, but cause an even deeper drop in price inﬂation, increasing the losses through that
channel. The contrast with the dynamics just described helps to highlight the role of imperfect
information in shaping the optimal equilibrium responses in the benchmark model. In this model,
policy responds to the productivity shock by lowering the nominal interestr a t eb e l o wt h en a t u r a l
rate, to limit the contractionary impact of the surge in productivity on labor demand and the
output gap. Diﬀerently from what would happen under the other speciﬁcations though, this milder
contraction in hours worked does not cause a jump in wage demands because of the slow adjustment
of workers’ estimates of future productivity. The net result is a price deﬂa t i o no fv e r ys i m i l a r
propositions to that observed under the alternative speciﬁcations, but with very diﬀerent welfare
consequences.
One notable implication of the welfare ranking of the optimal policies across the models illus-
trated in ﬁgure 9 is that indexation of wages to observed productivity growth results in higher
losses than indexation to its forecast. This might seem surprising, since in a perfectly competitive
labor market real wages should eﬃciently incorporate all shocks to productivity, which is just the
32 T h es e c o n dl i n eo ft h eﬁgure reports the forecastable components of ˜ πt and ˜ π
w
t , and not of the measured inﬂation
rates πt and π
w
t , whose values are instead reported in the ﬁrst line. This explains why the sum of the responses in
the second and third line is not equal to those in the ﬁrst.
29opposite of what happens in our model. The solution to this apparent paradox is in the nature of
the approximation to the “true” loss function adopted here, and in particular in the assumption
that the economy is close to being eﬃcient. This assumption implies that, up to ﬁrst order, real
wages are in fact indexed to productivity growth, or more precisely that ﬂuctuations in productivity
are small enough that the fact that wages are not indexed to its growth rate (but only to its steady
state value) does not have ﬁrst order welfare consequences. As a result, the only sources of welfare
losses left in our approximation are the second order distortions emerging from price dispersion.
But a high degree of price dispersion, and high losses, are exactly what will result from a model
in which newly set wages are based on ﬁltered estimates of future productivity, while contractual
wages are indexed to its much more volatile realized value.
5.1 Simple Policy Rules
Targeting rules Our last look at the issue of optimal monetary policy design in response to
growth rate shocks is through the window of the targeting rules introduced in section 2.7. Figure 10
compares equilibrium ﬂuctuations and level of welfare, as measured by the “inﬂation equivalent”,
under the optimal policy and three simple policies that target price inﬂation, wage inﬂation and
the forecast of the output gap.
The ﬁrst notable aspect of this comparison is that strict inﬂation targeting is a particularly un-
desirable policy to insulate the economy from the eﬀect of trend productivity shocks.33 Diﬀerently
from what is commonly argued though, this is not because, in the attempt of stabilizing inﬂation,
the central bank might end up “chocking” real growth. On the contrary, according to the model,
to prevent inﬂation from falling in response to a positive shock, monetary policy needs to main-
tain an expansionary stance. This expansion will then result in a boom in demand, which leads
workers to set higher wages, increasing their volatility. Of course, from a welfare perspective, the
higher volatility in wage inﬂation is compensated by the complete stabilization of price inﬂation.
Quantitatively, these opposing eﬀects appear roughly equivalent, if we compare the ﬂuctuations
under price inﬂation stabilization (the thick dashed line) to those under wage stabilization (the
dashed-dotted line), leaving us with a signiﬁcant unexplained welfare gap between the two policies.
We can reconcile these apparently contradictory observations if we note that, under the benchmark
calibration, the variability of wages receives nine times as much weight in the loss function as in-
ﬂation ﬂuctuations, due to the lower frequency with which wages are expected to adjust (see table
5). This asymmetry reﬂects in turn the intuitive observation that, for a given amount of volatility
in the growth rate of a price index, higher stickiness gives rise to more dispersion in the underlying
price distribution (Aoki, 2001; Benigno, 2000). If we are willing to accept this simple intuition as
the basis of our welfare criterion, and we trust the empirical evidence of more stickiness in the labor
rather than in the goods’ market, the result follows immediately. We ﬁnd that this example oﬀers
33 Blanchard (1997) ﬁrst pointed out the undesirable consequences of strict inﬂation targeting in a stylized model
with wage stickiness. This point was further elaborated by Erceg et al. (2000).
30an especially compelling illustration of the misleading welfare implications that might be drawn
from a welfare criterion not carefully grounded in the microeconomic details of the model economy.
In light of the preceding observations, it is then not surprising that a policy that stabilizes
nominal wage inﬂation around its steady state growth rate γ, would produce better outcomes than
those obtained under inﬂation stabilization. Note also that wage inﬂation targeting is close to a
mirror image of strict inﬂation targeting in that it requires a contraction in monetary policy to
reduce the demand for goods and labor services and workers’ wage demands. This avoids the surge
in wage inﬂation that would otherwise follow the positive productivity shock, but also causes a fairly
pronounced disinﬂation. As already pointed out though, this leaves the representative consumer
better oﬀ because the undesirable ﬂuctuations in inﬂation can be more easily absorbed, thanks to
the relative ﬂexibility of goods’ prices.
Role of relative stickiness T h er o l eo fr e l a t i v ep r i c es t i c k i n e s si sc o n ﬁrmed by ﬁgure 11, in
which we report impulse responses for the Amato and Laubach (2002) calibration, αp = αw = .66,
which also implies almost equal weights for price and wage inﬂation in the loss function (see table
5). In this case, optimal policy tries to balance the opposite ﬂuctuations in price and wage inﬂation,
reﬂecting their similar weights in the welfare function. Note however that, due to wages’ higher
ﬂexibility, wage inﬂation grows higher than in the benchmark case, even if the policy contraction
is accompanied by a slightly deeper and more prolonged recession. Similarly, inﬂation ﬂuctuations
are at least in part dampened by the higher price stickiness, resulting in higher inﬂation (i.e. less
deﬂation) regardless of the more pronounced recession.
Output gap forecast targeting Returning now to ﬁgure 10, we observe that the policy
that stabilizes the forecast of the output gap produces intermediate results between the inﬂation
targeting policies considered above. Under output gap targeting, a modest drop in the interest rate
limits the negative impact of the surge in productivity on the output gap, preventing the boom
that characterizes inﬂation targeting as well as the recession that accompanies the stabilization of
wage inﬂation. What is more remarkable though is the fact that output gap forecast targeting
closely approximates the optimal policy, almost exactly reproducing its equilibrium ﬂuctuations.
This does not at all depend on the direct welfare eﬀect of a stable output gap on the volatility
of hours, since this component of the policy objective receives a negligible share of the weight in
the utility approximation (see table 5). This result stems rather from the fact that stabilizing
the forecast of the output gap achieves (almost) the right balance between ﬂuctuations in the two
price indexes that dominate the welfare criterion (Woodford, 2002). Furthermore, this conclusion is
robust to the alternative calibration considered in ﬁg u r e1 1 ,e v e nt h o u g hi nt h i sc a s eas l i g h t l ym o r e
pronounced contraction than that produced by the targeting policy would be desirable. Finally, we
should point out that the desirability of output gap targeting, already noted for example by Erceg
et al. (2000) in their related model with price and wage rigidities, carries over to our framework,
in which the output gap is in fact unobservable, under the form of output gap forecast targeting.
31In other words, even in an economy like ours, in which the monetary authority lacks an accurate
measure of the output gap within the quarter, almost optimal results can be obtained by simply
targeting the available estimates of the output gap.34
In conclusion, we can summarize the ﬁndings in this section by noting that a positive shock
to the growth rate of productivity, though temporary, has a permanent eﬀect on the level of
productivity, therefore requiring an equivalent increase in the real wage in the long run. According
to our analysis, this should be achieved by a combination of positive nominal wage inﬂation and
deﬂation in the price of consumption. The optimal combination of these two changes depends
on the relative stickiness of the two prices, with the more ﬂexible price carrying the bulk of the
adjustment.
6 Optimal Policy, Stagﬂation and the New Economy
The attempt to bring our model to bear on some speciﬁc historical episodes, what we referred to
as case studies, has been so far only positive in nature. In section 4, we simulated the model’s
responses to a technology shock assuming that monetary policy followed the interest rate rule
estimated by Clarida et al. (2000) for the Volcker-Greenspan era, which we argued is a reasonable
characterization of actual policy for the post-1979 period. This approach to the case studies left at
least two important questions unanswered. First, how close is the Volcker-Greenspan interest rate
rule to the optimal policy prescribed by the model for the second half of the 1990s? and, second,
does the failure of the model to reproduce the dynamic properties of output and inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
1970s depend on the assumed speciﬁcation of the interest rate rule? We take up these questions in
turn in the rest of the section.
Figure 12 provides a clear answer to the ﬁrst question: actual policy in the 1990s was very
close to optimal according to our model. In fact, optimal ﬂuctuations in output, and especially in
inﬂation, are signiﬁcantly closer to the data than those implied by the interest rate rule underlying
ﬁgure 6, and the same is true for the Federal Funds rate, especially in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h es a m -
ple.35 Interestingly, the policy loosening of 1998:IV corresponds to the ﬁrst signiﬁcant departure
of measured growth from the model’s prediction, while the tightening of the last three quarters of
the sample, which exceeds the model’s prescription, is associated with a pronounced decline in the
growth rate of real activity. In conclusion, our analysis corroborates the widespread opinion that
the Federal Reserve skillfully steered the U.S. economy of the second half of the nineties in the face
of the non trivial challenges posed by a signiﬁcant shift in the growth rate of productivity.
Turning now to the period following the 1973 productivity slowdown, we recall from ﬁgure 7 that
the model falls signiﬁcantly short of replicating the extreme volatility found in the data, especially
34 Interestingly, Amato and Laubach (2002), in a model much closer to ours than that of Erceg et al. (2000), ﬁnd
that “a strong interest rate response to the output gap can lead to severely sub-optimal outcomes.” They however
do not explicitly consider output gap targeting rules.
35 The dip in the interest rate in 1998:IV corresponds to the loosening of policy that followed the Russian debt
crisis and the default of LTCM in the summer of 1998.
32in inﬂation. This is indeed not too surprising, especially if we contrast the model’s extremely
restricted set of shocks with the turbulence in the fundamentals that is one of the period’s most
salient features (Primiceri, 2002; Stock and Watson, 2002). One popular explanation for this
turbulence has been advanced by Clarida et al. (2000), who argue that monetary policy in the
pre-Volcker period did not fulﬁll the “Taylor principle”, resulting in indeterminacy of the rational
expectations equilibrium and sunspot ﬂuctuations. Since our solution algorithm cannot simulate an
indeterminate system, we cannot directly test this theory within our model. Nevertheless, we can
investigate the role of diﬀerent parametrizations of the interest rate rule on the model’s equilibrium,
at least as long as they guarantee its existence and uniqueness. Figure 13 then displays simulated
and actual data on GDP growth and inﬂation under the pre-Volcker rule in table 6. This is the
rule estimated by Clarida et al. (2000) for the period 1960:I to 1979:II, except for the coeﬃcient on
inﬂation, which we assume takes the value closest to the estimate, but that is still compatible with
equilibrium determinacy.36 Surprisingly, this rule dampens the predicted ﬂuctuations in inﬂation
when compared to the Volcker-Greenspan rule (ﬁgure 7), even leading to a fall in inﬂation in
the second part of the sample. This evidence cannot of course rule out the interpretation of the
data proposed by Clarida et al. (2000), since our model is silent on what would happen if the
coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the policy reaction function were in fact lower than one. Nevertheless,
this exercise suggests that the failure of the model to account for the quantitative extent of the
observed ﬂuctuations does not depend on the kind of interest rate rule assumed in ﬁgure 7, at least
as long as we restrict our analysis to the class of determinate rules.
There is however something more that we can learn from the model about the role of monetary
policy in the economic landscape of the seventies. To this eﬀect, ﬁgure 14 contains a fairly detailed
comparison between the data and the model’s optimal equilibrium, which includes inﬂation, GDP
growth, real wage inﬂation and the ex-post real interest rate. This picture conﬁrms that the
observed ﬂuctuations in real activity and inﬂation were indeed much wider than those produced by
the model, when perturbed by only one technology shock. Interestingly though, if we concentrate
only on the ﬁrst few quarters of the period, up to the beginning of 1975, we observe a combination
of tight monetary policy, depressed output, a real wage inﬂation that is broadly in line with the
model’s prediction, but still high inﬂation. This particular macroeconomic conﬁguration is at least
in principle compatible with the traditional idea that the run up in inﬂation was the product of the
oil price shock of 1973, to which monetary policy clearly appears to have responded fairly vigorously
at the outset. High real interest rates in the face of a “cost-push” shock could in turn explain the
precipitous drop in demand and the high level of inﬂation, in the absence of signiﬁcant cost pressures
originating from the labor markets. On the other hand, the subsidence of the commodity price shock
in 1975, and the concomitant loosening of policy, might explain the decline in inﬂation, the steep
recovery of output and the subsequent build up of cost pressures in the labor market. Note also
that policy did not turn loose in comparison to the model’s prescription until the end of 1976, at
36 Clarida et al. (2000) estimate a value for the reaction coeﬃcient to inﬂation of 0.83, with a standard deviation
of 0.07.
33which point inﬂation started inching up again. We hasten to emphasize that this reconstruction of
the events is highly speculative, even though roughly in line with the chronology of the commodity
price shocks emphasized by Blinder (1979), and with some of the conclusions of De Long’s (1997)
inﬂuential work on the subject.37 Whether augmenting the model with an exogenous source of cost
pressure, like a commodity price shock, could help to reconcile quantitatively its predictions with
the data is a question that we leave for future research.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we investigated the relationship between monetary policy and productivity growth,
from both a positive and a normative perspective. We argued that standard New Keynesian models,
built around the assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market, do not capture a key feature
of the data, the negative correlation between inﬂation and real activity conditional on productivity
shocks. To solve this problem, we proposed a model in which wages respond to persistent growth
rate shocks with a delay. This is due to a particular form of imperfect information, whereby agents,
after observing a shock, cannot conclusively establish its degree of persistence. As a result, when
the shock is in fact persistent, workers come to this realization only gradually, so that wage demands
lag behind realized productivity, moderating the reaction of marginal costs and inﬂation.
An extensive investigation of the model’s equilibrium behavior documented that it represents a
signiﬁcant improvement over the existing literature. The model’s dynamics following a productivity
shock, calibrated to match that identiﬁed by Altig et al. (2002) within a structural VAR, are
qualitatively and quantitatively in line with the estimated responses. In particular, the model is
able to reproduce the conditionally negative correlation between inﬂation and output that is one of
the salient features of the data. Moreover, it provides a remarkably close account of the evolution
of labor productivity, inﬂation, output and interest rates that followed the “New Economy shock”
of the mid-nineties. All these considerations lead us to conclude that the model safely qualiﬁes as
an adequate laboratory to study the optimal policy response to technology shocks.
In the normative part of the analysis then, we found that this response is characterized by
deﬂation in the goods’ market and by a moderate amount of nominal wage inﬂation, at least when
compared with the predictions of the standard model. The economic nature of this response can be
summarized by noting that cointegration of income and real wages implies that a permanent increase
in productivity must be followed by an equivalent movement in real wages. In the optimum, this
is achieved by an increase in the nominal wage, accompanied by a fall in the price of consumption,
with the less sticky of the two price indexes carrying the bulk of the adjustment. In our benchmark
model, this adjustment is engineered by the monetary authority through a reduction in the nominal
interest rate. In other words, the popular argument that monetary policy should “accommodate” a
37 DeLong (1997) writes for example: “(...) I would tentatively conclude that the supply shocks of the 1970s were
in large part sound and fury. They came. They caused headlines, jumps in the price level, and recessions. And when
they had passed the inﬂation situation was much the same as before their impact.”
34surge in the growth rate of productivity survives the scrutiny of our formal analysis. Nevertheless, a
reduction in nominal rates is optimal here not because it allows higher productivity to be turned into
higher output, but rather because it contributes to balance wage and price adjustments, minimizing
the distortions associated with price dispersion. Not surprisingly then, a policy of strict inﬂation
targeting, forcing the adjustment of real wages to fall entirely on nominal wage changes, results
in undesirable welfare consequences. Finally, we argued that the pickup in productivity was the
predominant inﬂuence on the observed ﬂuctuations of output and inﬂation in the second half of
the 1990s, and that the stance of American monetary policy in that same period was very close to
that prescribed by the model.
35A Derivation of the Welfare Criterion
This appendix derives expressions for the price and wage dispersion measures Varzˆ pt (z) and
Varj ˆ wt (j) as a function of inﬂation in the associated price indexes, following the steps described
in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
Starting from the price dispersion measure, we deﬁne ¯ pt ≡ Ez lnpt (z), ¯ pi
t−1 ≡ ¯ pt−1 + λpπt−1
and ∆
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which substituted back into (22) yields
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where we are suppressing terms of third order or higher. Substituting this expression into (21)
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36where unf collects terms that cannot be forecasted on the basis of information available at time
−1.
As for wage dispersion, we proceed analogously and after deﬁning ¯ wt ≡ Ej lnwt (j), ¯ wi
t−1 ≡
¯ wt−1 + Et−2 lnΩt and ∆w
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which, following Woodford (2002, chapter 6), can be solved backwards to yield
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where the weights, normalized so that Λp + Λw =1 ,a r e
Λp ≡ θp(ξpψp)
−1
Ω ; Λw ≡ θw(ξwψwφ)−1
Ω ; Λx ≡ 1+ω
Ω
37B Solution and Filtering
Even though the paper reports results only for the parametrization of the productivity process
discussed in section 2.8, our solution procedure can accommodate a much more general class of
processes. This section discusses the outline of that procedure under these more general assump-
tions.
We consider a stochastic process for the growth rate of productivity of the form
ˆ γa
t =ˆ γt + µa (L)εa
t


















while ρ(L),µ a (L) and µγ (L) are polynomials in the lag operator. Following Hamilton (1994,
section 13.1), this process can be represented in state space form as
ˆ γa
t = µ0ξt
ξt+1 = Ξξt + Θ t+1 (24)






































with Σ ≡ E [ t 0
t]. Note that in the full information case the state vector would simply be forecasted
as
ξt+1|t = Ξξt
Deﬁning now an appropriate partition of the vector of endogenous variables yt between jumps





































































and (24), we write recursively as
yt =
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with the obvious deﬁnition of the extended state X
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39C Computing the Optimal Policy
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The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem are
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where the vector ¯ yt now also contains the multipliers. The solution to this system is again of the
form
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where ¯ L solves the Sylvester equation
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Table 1: Calibrated parameter values: productivity process.
Tastes Technology
β .99 φ−1 .75
ν .2 ωp .33
(θp − 1)
−1 .19 (θw − 1)
−1 .13
Table 2: Calibrated parameter values: tastes and technology.
Stickiness CE AL Indexation ALf ALp
αp .42 .66 λγ 1 0
αw .78 .66 λp 0 0
˜ ψp .56 .56 λw 0 0
˜ ψw .56 .56
Table 3: Calibrated parameter values. Stickiness: CE refers to the benchmark calibration; AL
refers to the estimates of Amato and Laubach (2002). Indexation: ALf represents indexation of
wages to the forecast of productivity; ALp represents indexation of wages to past productivity.
47Phillips Curves Parameters








1+ωpθp κp = ξpωp
ψw =
αw˜ ψw
1−˜ ψw(1−αw) ξw = 1−αw
αw
1−αwβ
1+νθw κw = ξw (1 + ωw)
Table 4: Parameters of the wage and price Phillips curves, expressed as functions of the structural
parameters.




Table 5: Calibrated parameter values: loss function. CE and AL denote the values of the welfare
weights derived under the benchmark calibration and the estimates of Amato and Laubach (2002)
respectively.




Table 6: Calibrated parameter values: interest rate rule. The Volcker-Greenspan column refers to
estimates in Galí et al. (2000) for the period 1979:III to 1996:IV, while the Pre-Volcker column
refers to estimates for the period 1960:I to 1979:II.
48Empirical Impulse Responses
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to an innovation in technology (from Altig et al., 2002). The shaded
area denotes 95% conﬁdence bands.
49Growth Rate of Productivity, Actual and Forecasted




























growth rate of productivity
to a 1% persistent technology shock (ε
γ
t ), under full and partial information. Productivity growth
is expressed as an annualized percentage rate.
50Benchmark Model
















































Figure 3: Simulated impulse responses to a 1% ε
γ
t shock for the benchmark model; monetary policy
is assumed to target the one period ahead forecast of the output gap. Inﬂations and the interest rate
gap are expressed as annualized percentage rates, while the output gap is expressed in percentage
points per quarter.
51Model Comparison: Informational Frictions




























































Figure 4: Simulated impulse responses to a 1% ε
γ
t shock under the Volcker-Greenspan interest rate
rule (table 6). ALp and ALf refer to the type of wage indexation (table 3);Fa n dPr e f e rt oF u l l
and Partial information respectively; s refers to the simple model with no information delays. The
thick line (ALf-P) is the benchmark model. Inﬂations and the interest rate gap are expressed as
annualized percentage rates, while the level variables are expressed as percentage deviations from
their steady state value; the long horizon forecasts are expressed in percentage points per quarter.
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Figure 5: Simulated impulse responses to the unconditional shock (εt) under the Volcker-Greenspan
interest rate rule (table 6). ALp and ALf refer to the type of wage indexation (table 3); F and P
refer to Full and Partial information respectively; s refers to the simple model with no information
delays. The thick line (ALf-P) is the benchmark model. Inﬂation and the interest rate are expressed
as annualized percentage rates, while the level variables are expressed as percentage deviations from
their steady state value.
53Case Study: The New Economy



















Figure 6: Simulated (dotted line) and actual (solid line) evolution of productivity growth, inﬂation
and GDP growth for the period 1996:I to 2000:IV, under the Volcker-Greenspan interest rate rule.
The model is hit in 1996:I with a productivity shock that decays like an AR(1) process with the
benchmark parameter 0.8. All variables are expressed as growth rates over the previous year, in
deviation from their average over the year 1995.
54Case Study: The Productivity Slowdown











Figure 7: Simulated (dotted line) and actual (solid line) evolution of productivity growth, inﬂation
and GDP growth for the period 1973:III to 1978:II, under the Volcker-Greenspan interest rate rule.
The model is hit in 1973:III with a productivity shock that decays like an AR(1) process with the
benchmark parameter 0.8. All variables are expressed as growth rates over the previous year, in
deviation from their average over the entire business cycle 1971:I-1973:II.
55Optimal Policy: Unconditional Shock

























































Figure 8: Simulated impulse responses to the unconditional shock (εt) under the Volcker-Greenspan
interest rate rule (table 6). ALp and ALf refer to the type of wage indexation (table 3); F and P
refer to Full and Partial information respectively; s refers to the simple model with no information
delays. The thick line (ALf-P) is the benchmark model. Inﬂation and the interest rate are expressed
as annualized percentage rates, while the level variables are expressed as percentage deviations from
their steady state value.
56Optimal Policy: Trend Shock













































































































Figure 9: Simulated impulse responses to a 1% ε
γ
t shock under the optimal policy. ALp and
ALf refer to the type of wage indexation (table 3); F and P refer to Full and Partial information
respectively; s refers to the simple model with no information delays. The thick line (ALf-P) is
the benchmark model. π∗ is the “inﬂation equivalent”. Inﬂations and the interest rate gap are
expressed as annualized percentage rates, while the output gap is expressed in percentage points
per quarter.
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Optimal Policy;  π
*=2
Figure 10: Simulated impulse responses to a 1% ε
γ
t shock under the optimal policy; benchmark
calibration. The diﬀerent line styles refer to inﬂation targeting, nominal wage inﬂation targeting,
output gap forecast targeting and the optimal policy, as indicated by the legend. π∗ is the “inﬂation
equivalent”. Inﬂations and the interest rate gap are expressed as annualized percentage rates, while
the output gap is expressed in percentage points per quarter.
58Policy Comparison: Relative Stickiness

















































































































Figure 11: Simulated impulse responses to a 1% ε
γ
t shock under the optimal policy, with αw =
αp =0 .66. The diﬀerent line styles refer to inﬂation targeting, nominal wage inﬂation targeting,
output gap forecast targeting and the optimal policy, as indicated by the legend. π∗ is the “inﬂation
equivalent”. Inﬂations and the interest rate gap are expressed as annualized percentage rates, while
the output gap is expressed in percentage points per quarter.
59Optimal Policy: The New Economy



















Figure 12: Simulated (dotted line) and actual (solid line) evolution of Federal Funds rate, inﬂation
and GDP growth for the period 1996:I to 2000:IV, under the optimal policy. The model is hit in
1996:I with a productivity shock that decays like an AR(1) process with parameter 0.9. Inﬂation
and GDP growth are expressed as percentage growth rates over the previous year, while the Federal
Funds rate is expressed in annualized percentage points per quarter. All variables are in deviation
from their average over the year 1995.
60The Pre-Volcker Interest Rate Rule











Figure 13: Simulated (dotted line) and actual (solid line) evolution of productivity growth, inﬂation
and GDP growth for the period 1973:III to 1978:II, under the pre-Volcker interest rate rule. The
model is hit in 1973:III with a productivity shock that decays like an AR(1) process with the
benchmark parameter 0.8. All variables are expressed as growth rates over the previous year, in
deviation from their average over the entire business cycle 1971:I-1973:II.





























Figure 14: Simulated (dotted line) and actual (solid line) evolution of GDP growth, inﬂation, real
wage inﬂation and the ex-post real interest rate for the period 1973:III to 1978:II, under the optimal
policy. The model is hit in 1973:III with a productivity shock that decays like an AR(1) process
with the benchmark parameter 0.8. All variables are expressed as growth rates over the previous
year, with the exception of the interest rate, which is a four quarters moving average of annualized
quarterly rates.
62